

SECRET

COPY NO. 70

OCI NO. 0306/61

17 November 1961

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

25X1

25X1

State Department review completed

228522
1-2

THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.

Page Denied

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied

25X1

25X1

25X1

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****WEEKLY REVIEW****EAST-WEST DEVELOPMENTS**

Now that Adenauer has been installed as chancellor in West Germany and the Soviet 22nd party congress has ended, Moscow is stepping up the pace of its diplomatic moves in an effort to induce the West to agree to early negotiations on Berlin and Germany. As part of their effort to create an impression of reasonableness on Berlin, Soviet leaders since the congress have used a wide variety of maneuvers to convey an impression of flexibility in any negotiations. The substance of the Soviet position, however, remains unchanged from the presentation made by Foreign Minister Gromyko in his talks in the United States.

Khrushchev-Kroll Talks

On 9 November, Khrushchev indicated to West German Ambassador Kroll that he could accept the ambassador's suggestion for a combination of four-power and bilateral agreements to ensure Berlin's viability and free access. Soviet officials then passed to Western journalists in Moscow a four-point plan characterized as a "radical change" in Soviet policy, which included some of Kroll's suggestions but was more in line with Gromyko's approach in the United States.

Kroll put forward a plan involving a four-power agreement on a status for West Berlin and free access; a Soviet - East German agreement in which the Ulbricht regime would undertake to respect the four-power accord; and certain other points regarding further negotiations on a peace treaty. Khrushchev apparently was receptive to Kroll's suggestions.

The Soviet version of Kroll's plan immediately conveyed to Western correspondents

included the four-power agreement on Berlin and the Soviet - East German agreement, but added the vague formula used by Gromyko in his talks in the US--that the Western powers would undertake "to respect East German sovereignty." The Soviet version merely referred to the conclusion of a peace treaty as the final step. Such exploitation of Kroll's plan suggests that the Soviet leaders view it as an opportunity to stimulate debate in the West and to increase public pressure for formal negotiations to determine the Soviet bargaining price for agreement.

Moscow reported that Khrushchev received Kroll but said nothing about the details of the conversation. A TASS dispatch reporting on Kroll's recall to Bonn quoted a Bonn spokesman as saying that Kroll "aired 'some views'" that were unauthorized by Bonn, without mentioning them, and cited West German commentators who "admit that, under certain circumstances, Kroll's actions could have moved the negotiations on the German and West Berlin problems off dead center." TASS portrayed Kroll as a victim of "the atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion within the Western camp" and reported that Bonn is ready to sacrifice him in order to restore Washington's confidence on the eve of Adenauer's visit.

Other Soviet Moves

While the Soviet press has been giving relatively restrained treatment to Berlin developments, a speaker at a public lecture in Moscow on 12 November ridiculed the Western response to the 13 August measures. According to the US Embassy, the speaker said, "All they could do was talk."

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

When the East Germans instituted controls over Western civilian officials, the US was said to have made a "show of force"; however, the appearance of Soviet tanks exposed the emptiness of the US action, and US acceptance of East German control was said to be confirmed when the US adopted similar controls on 1 November. The speaker claimed that these events show the West is accepting the existence of the German Democratic Republic, and that negotiations will lead to the peaceful resolution of the West Berlin problem.

Two days before Khrushchev's conversation with Kroll, Gromyko used his informal conversation with the US, British, and West German ambassadors at a reception to underscore the USSR's readiness for four-power negotiations on a Berlin settlement. On the substance of the Berlin and German questions, Gromyko confirmed that the negotiations could be limited to the problems of access to, and the status of, West Berlin. He apparently outlined the points later given to Western correspondents as a new Soviet approach. He indicated that present financial and economic ties between Bonn and Berlin could be maintained, but not formal ties.

Soviet Comment on Party Congress

Soviet officials have been seeking to persuade Western representatives that developments at the party congress should be interpreted as a favorable sign for Western interests, particularly in regard to Berlin. On 25 October, a Soviet Foreign Ministry official claimed that the "anti-party" group had opposed efforts to improve Soviet-American

relations and implied that the renewed attacks on the group should therefore be regarded by the West as an encouraging development.

Disarmament and Test Ban Issues

In private conversations with various UN delegates, Soviet delegates have urged agreement to add three neutral countries to the original ten-nation committee for future disarmament negotiations. However, at a 14 November luncheon with US delegates, two Soviet delegates said nothing about a five-five-three forum and repeated the old proposal for a "troika" forum--five Western, five bloc, and five neutral representatives. The US delegation believes the Soviets returned to the troika in order to re-establish a basic negotiating position. In his 15 November speech opening the UN disarmament debate, Soviet delegate Zorin called for "equal" representation for the bloc, the West, and the neutrals.

A Soviet spokesman told a Canadian delegate that the USSR is anxious to start disarmament negotiations "early next year." The spokesman also said that the USSR has detected growing reluctance on the part of the US to begin disarmament talks and presumes the reason is that the US believes such talks would be interpreted as a sign of weakness on Berlin. Soviet delegates have also expressed willingness to conduct further bilateral talks with the US, particularly on the issue of a new disarmament forum.

There has been no Soviet response to the US-British notes of 13 November urging a resumption of the Geneva test ban talks later this month. The sharp attack by the Soviet delegate on the Anglo-American UN resolution calling for a resumption of negotiations on a test ban treaty, and the bloc vote against the resolution makes it clear that Moscow will reject the US-British offer and continue to insist that the nuclear test question be considered only in the context of general and complete disarmament.

SECRET

25X1

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

FINNISH-SOVIET RELATIONS

Gromyko's talk with Finnish Foreign Minister Karjalainen has had an immediate impact on Finland's internal politics. The decision by President Kekkonen on 14 November to dissolve parliament and to call for new elections on 4 and 5 February 1962 reflects his determination to seek a renewed mandate for his policy of friendly neutrality and accommodation toward the USSR. The move is also designed to impress upon the Finnish electorate the necessity of choosing legislators who share Kekkonen's views, and to secure the basis for a broadened government.

The Soviet foreign minister told Karjalainen on 11 November that if the USSR were assured "quickly" that the present orientation of Finland's foreign policy would continue, military talks on mutual defense--the question raised in the Soviet note of 30 October--could "perhaps be avoided." To ensure Finnish compliance Gromyko pointed out that the Soviet military had been demanding "military negotiations."

Gromyko criticized the political situation in Finland as "unstable" and accused "a certain political grouping" of desiring a change in Finnish foreign policy--an obvious reference to the five parties supporting Kekkonen's chief rival in the January presidential election, Olavi Honka. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Gromyko also characterized Finland's minority Agrarian government as too weak to guarantee current Finnish policy.

In the communiqué issued by the Finnish Government following Karjalainen's return from Moscow, however, Gromyko is quoted as stating that the USSR did not have the "least intention of interfering in Finland's internal affairs." He reportedly did not demand the inclusion of the Communist-front Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL) in a new government.

The Soviets' latest move seems designed primarily to guarantee a victory for Kekkonen in the presidential election on 15 January. His re-election was likely even before the Soviets took action, but they apparently feared that Kekkonen's chances were endangered by the coalescing of the opposition around Honka. Radio reports from Helsinki state that the Social Democrats and Conservatives are considering withdrawing their support of Honka.

By calling parliamentary elections so soon after the voting for presidential electors, Kekkonen hopes to strengthen his parliamentary position, broaden the government, and secure further endorsement of his foreign policy. All Finnish political parties officially support his policy of neutrality and friendship with the USSR. Parliamentary elections held in the present state of apprehension over Soviet intentions will tend to bring to the fore the figures in all parties who support Kekkonen's views on accommodating the USSR. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

SECRET

LAOS

and now is willing to hold a meeting with Boun Oum and Souphannouvong at Vientiane



from 24 to 27 November. He has called for the Boun Oum group to send a delegation to the Plaine des Jarres to arrange the details for the proposed meeting. Such an offer, if confirmed, would constitute a substantial concession by Souvanna and Souphannouvong, who heretofore have been adamant in their official position that the meeting should be held at the Plaine des Jarres.

The Laotian Army, apparently for the purpose of improving its general positions, has begun clearing operations in the northwestern and southern provinces. Scattered

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

skirmishing is continuing in and south of the Plaine des Jarres between Meo units and enemy forces. Meo forces in the Pou Khe area west of Xieng Khouang have been forced to withdraw to more defensible positions nearby.

Although there has been some progress at Geneva on Western proposals aimed at strengthening the articles dealing with the role of the International Control Commission (ICC) in Laos, Soviet delegate Pushkin strongly objected to the Western position on two issues. In an exchange on 10 November with the UK delegate, Pushkin "blew up" over the submission of draft proposals which called for the "free and unrestricted access to all parts of Laos" for the ICC in conducting its investigations. Pushkin accused the West of dishonesty and said that the draft on access was designed to have the ICC control the neutrality of Laos.

At a 13 November meeting of the co-chairmen and the neutral conferees at Geneva, Pushkin assailed Boun Oum and Phoumi and remarked that it was up to the Western powers to "put pressure on them to go to the 17 November meeting with Souvanna." Pushkin accused the Western powers of "foot-dragging" and brought up the 10 November draft proposals on the ICC as an example of the West's unyielding position. At a meeting with the UK representative on 14 November, all the neutrals agreed with Pushkin that the US draft articles were unnecessary.

Peiping is attempting to raise tension over Laos with propaganda implying a possible resumption of hostilities. The Chinese approach is intended to exert pressure for prompt formation of a coalition government in Laos. Peiping has appointed its ambassador to North Vietnam as "economic and cultural" representative to Souvanna Phouma.

25X1

SOUTH VIETNAM

Viet Cong activities, involving widespread guerrilla attacks, terrorism, and propaganda at the village level, continue at a high rate. The Communists have demonstrated an ability to launch attacks involving as many as 1,000 men against regular South Vietnamese forces, and indications point to more frequent efforts of this scope, particularly in the high plateau region in the north-central part of the country.

25X1

25X1

Diem has transferred the National Police and Security Service (NPSS) to the jurisdiction of the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), a move which should enhance South Vietnam's intelligence and security capabilities. In line with the government's intensified austerity campaign under the recently proclaimed national state of emergency, the National Assembly is considering a bill which would cut salaries of all government officials on a sliding scale, suspend annual leave and reduce the number of holidays, and provide a 100-percent increase in the amusement tax.

Meanwhile, in an unprecedented effort to harness broad support for a government undertaking, Diem has expanded flood relief into a National Mutual Aid Movement, including well-known opposition figures and representatives of various religious groups who are normally excluded from public life.

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

CONGO

The murder of 13 Italian UN airmen by mutinous Gizengist troops at Kindu has brought an angry reaction on the part of the UN and could foreshadow hostilities between UN forces and Gizengist units of the Congo Army. On 15 November the UN Secretariat authorized a punitive air strike, but a UN spokesman in Leopoldville indicated the next day that the UN command had dropped this idea and would merely press an investigation into the deaths of the airmen.

Gizenga is believed to be supervising his "invasion" of northern Katanga from somewhere in southern Kivu Province. UN authorities appear to have facilitated the movement of Gizengist troops into Katanga, presumably on the theory that the main enemy was Tshombé. Now, however, it is holding Gizenga responsible for the depredations of his troops, in contrast to its earlier reluctance to take issue with Gizenga's secessionist movement. This reaction will probably be welcomed in Katanga, which because of Tshombé's secession has been the primary target for UN pressure and sanctions.

Gizenga's military push toward northern Katanga--apparently involving about 3,000 troops--began in early November. At the same time the UN, acting on behalf of the central government, sought to fill the political vacuum in northern Katanga and to stimulate pro-Leopoldville sentiment among anti-Tshombé Baluba tribesmen in the area.

Between 9 and 11 November, Baluba elements gained control of Albertville, ostensibly in the name of the central government but, according to one UN report, primarily for purposes of pillage. Although neither the invading Congo Army force nor the Baluba tribesmen showed any strong attachment to Leopold-


ville, they appeared united in their hostility toward Europeans and the Tshombé regime. In Elisabethville, Tshombé appeared undecided whether to defend northern Katanga, an area over which he had never exercised firm control.

Meanwhile, UN representative Khiari, who forced his way into Gizenga's Stanleyville office on 9 November when Gizenga refused to see him, became pessimistic about the prospect that Gizenga might cooperate with Premier Adoula. Gizenga told Khiari that he had no confidence in the UN or any UN representative in the Congo, that they had all been "bought by Tshombé," and that the UN, "in connivance with Tshombé," had made only a weak pretense of invading Katanga.

In an attempt to make the invading Congo Army force responsive to Leopoldville, the Adoula government on 12-13 November made its peace with General Lundula, the nominal commander of Congolese forces in Orientale and Kivu provinces. Lundula's consultations in Leopoldville were cut short when, on 13 November, his soldiers in Kindu beat up and subsequently killed the Italian airmen. Lundula's attempt on 14 November to reassert control over his forces at Kindu resulted in a melee from which he fled for his life, although he subsequently returned for another try.

The UN Security Council, currently in session to consider authorizing the UN to take the offensive in bringing Katanga into line, will probably broaden its debate to include authorizing the use of force against the mutinous Gizengist troops. A draft resolution providing for UN use of "requisite measures of force" to get rid of mercenaries has been submitted by Ceylon, Liberia, and the UAR, the three Afro-Asian representatives on the council. Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak objects

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

25X1

to the draft resolution because it concentrates too narrowly on the Katanga problem and does not refer to the broader UN mission of reconciling opposing factions in the Congo.

The council is likely to endorse the further use of force in the Congo, but any resolution acceptable to all members will probably be so vaguely worded as to require the secretary general to interpret it as he conducts the UN Congo operation.

In Leopoldville, General Mobutu stated in mid-November that he had become reconciled to the disarmament of the entire Congo Army. With reference to the earlier depredations of Congo Army forces in Luluabourg, Mobutu said it might be necessary to organized an entirely new army, starting with new recruits. Mobutu's remarks were probably more indicative of despair than an exposition of a specific program.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****FRANCE-ALGERIA**

The hunger strike of rebel vice premier Ben Bella is developing into an issue which could jeopardize the success of secret talks between the French and the provisional Algerian government (PAG), which have reportedly produced substantial agreement on most major points. The PAG has so far stopped short of demanding Ben Bella's release as a condition for beginning formal negotiations, but has reportedly decided that such talks could not be scheduled while the hunger strike continues. De Gaulle has repeatedly said that Ben Bella will not be released until a cease-fire has been reached in Algeria, but officials in the French Foreign Ministry think that the government may make some gesture in this direction in order to permit negotiations to proceed.

Responsible Algerian sources have indicated to the US Embassy in Tunis that Ben Bella and the other imprisoned rebel leaders began the hunger strike on their own initiative. However, since thousands of Algerians held in France have joined in and the Moroccan Government has taken the lead in demanding Ben Bella's release, the PAG probably feels compelled to identify itself with the campaign.

Ambassador Walmsley in Tunis feels that the PAG will not push its protests any further than its internal politics require, and believes that if the French can induce Ben Bella to cease the strike on terms short of outright release,

the PAG will let the matter drop. He points out, however, that the imprisoned rebel leaders probably want at this time to make some dramatic contribution to Algerian independence and that the relations between them and the Tunis-based PAG--especially the question of Ben Bella's place in an independent Algeria--assume increasing importance as a settlement approaches.

A French Foreign Ministry official, noting that eight days elapsed between the announcement of Ben Bella's decision and the first PAG protests, believes that the rebels are far from happy at being pushed into this position at a time when they apparently want to negotiate a settlement. The French claim that the scope and effects of the general hunger strike among Algerians held in France have been exaggerated. The French have proclaimed publicly that only 4,000 Algerians --instead of the rumored 15,000 --are involved.

25X1

25X1

The Ben Bella issue has created a emotionally charged atmosphere in Morocco, where the government, in attempting to undercut opposition criticism that it has been pro-French, has championed Ben Bella's cause. Ambassador Bonsal has warned that continued tension over this issue could seriously affect the French position in Morocco, endanger French or even American lives, and pose a threat to political stability.

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

25X1

25X1

Commenting on the recent arrest of the ostensibly pro-French Moslem leader Abderrahman Fares, the US Embassy in Paris stated that it is somewhat surprising that the government should have renewed its offensive against the rebels inside France in such a spectacular fashion, and surmised that, in addition to its reprisal value, it might be partially attributed to a belief within certain government circles that such tough actions would strengthen the French negotiating position.

25X1

25X1

NEW SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE

The composition of party bodies elected at the recently concluded 22nd party congress indicates that the basic balance of forces in the Soviet Union--party boss vs. government administrator; local interests vs. central control--remains remarkably similar to that which existed in 1956. There is little reason to doubt that Khrushchev, if again faced with a challenge to his leadership, could count on the central committee for support, as he did in the June 1957 "anti-party group" affair.

The congress on 30 October "elected" the two bodies which are formally entrusted with conducting the important business of the party until

the next congress is held: the central committee, divided into 175 members and 155 candidate members, and a central auditing commission of 65 members. The central committee in turn "elected" the party presidium and secretariat--where the real power resides--and will meet periodically to rubber-stamp the decisions of the top leaders. The central auditing commission performs only minor functions in the field of party finances and accounting.

Next to the presidium and secretariat, the central committee and the central auditing commission are the major prestige bodies in the Soviet system. They are, in fact, a roster of the political elite. They

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

acted jointly on the only occasion in recent years when they are known to have exercised real power of decision--in 1957 when they supported Khrushchev against the "anti-party" majority on the presidium.

The potential of the central committee and central auditing commission for intervening in a top leadership dispute--as in 1957--makes it imperative that any leader who aspires to the apex of the power pyramid must establish bastions of personal political strength in those bodies. The composition of the new party bodies indicates that most of Khrushchev's lieutenants have had little success in this regard. Very few of the new men on these bodies have had discernible ties with any of the Soviet leaders.

The only change with apparent significance for the succession is an increase in the representation of men associated in one way or another with the Leningrad party organization--and therefore, presumably, men upon whom Frol Kozlov could rely for support. This change, however, is too slight to ensure Kozlov, whom Khrushchev had picked as early as June 1959 as his eventual successor, an unchallengeable position when the time comes to take over. The Ukrainian organization, for example, which at times has appeared to be slightly at odds with the Leningrad group, continues to be strongly represented.

As expected after the extensive purges of Soviet officialdom during the last three years, the turnover at the recent congress in the membership of the central committee and the auditing commission was higher than in the 1956 elec-

Growth in Size of the Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission

Congress	Central Committee		Central Auditing Commission	Total
	Members	Candidate Members		
18th (1939)	71	68	50	189
19th (1952)	125	111	37	273
20th (1956)	133	122	63	318
21st (1959)*				
22nd (1961)	175	155	65	395

Members Dropped from the Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission as a Percentage of the Members Elected at the Preceding Congress

Congress	Months Between Congresses		Rate of Attrition (percent)
	Months Between Congresses	Dropped	
15th (1927)	24	17%	.70 per month
16th (1930)	31	17%	.55 per month
17th (1934)	43	32%	.74 per month
18th (1939)	61	84%	1.39 per month
19th (1952)	163	63%	.39 per month
20th (1956)	40	35%	.89 per month
21st (1959)*			
22nd (1961)	68	50%	.74 per month

Membership of the Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission By Major Occupational Categories

		1956	1961
Party Officials		158	192
Of Which: Central Staff	23	36	
Government Officials		148	170
Of Which: Military	21	34	
Police	4	2	
Diplomatic	17	21	
Miscellaneous		23	38
Position Unknown		--	10
		329**	410***

By Administrative Level of Major Occupation

	1952	1956	1961
Central Officials	152	152	176
Republic Officials	42	57	90
Local Officials	79	109	127

* The 21st was a special congress which did not elect new central bodies.

** 11 are counted in two categories

*** 15 are counted in two categories

611115 3

25X1

tions. An analysis of the composition of the excluded group, however, casts no additional light on the reasons for the purges. Aside from the losers in the "anti-party group" affair,

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

all of whom have been dropped, there are almost no discernible groupings or common denominators among those who failed of reelection to reflect policy differences or political maneuvering.

Considering the cataclysmic changes in the top party leadership between the 19th and 20th congresses--the death of Stalin, the arrest and execution of secret police chief Beria, the demotion of Premier Malenkov, and the rise of Khrushchev to "first among equals"--the turnover in the secondary leadership at the 20th congress was remarkably small. Belated repercussions of those events, particularly following the ouster of the anti-party group, could account for a portion of the current turnover.

The proportion of party officials and government administrators on the new party bodies is approximately the same as in 1956, indicating that the political cloud under which the industrial administrators fell at the time of Khrushchev's reorganization of industrial management in 1957 has largely dissipated. The thesis that Khrushchev's renewed attack at the congress on the "anti-party group"--which had favored the government administrator vis-a-vis the party professional--was directed at least in part at elements in the current managerial leadership finds little support in the composition of the new bodies.

Among the government representatives the most significant change is a 50-percent increase in the number of military personnel, presumably reflecting the recent toughening of the Soviet position in the international arena. Seven of the marshals who were elected--

Bagramyan, Chuykov, Grechko, Krylov, Malinovsky, Moskalenko, and Zakharov--are members of the "southern clique" of field officers who fought with Khrushchev at Stalingrad. They have been brought increasingly to the fore at the expense of the Moscow supreme headquarters group--Bulganin, Zhukov, Vasilevsky, and others. More members have been drawn from the headquarters staff of the air force than from that of any other service--a fact which is a bit puzzling in view of Khrushchev's statement on the superiority of rockets over manned aircraft in modern warfare. The rocket forces are represented only by their commander in chief.

The cut in police representation from four to two, coupled with the subsequent replacement of Shelepin as security chief by a lesser-ranking party official, clearly reflects Khrushchev's determination to prevent the police from developing an independent power position as they had under Beria.

The only noteworthy change among the party representatives is the increase in the number of officials from the central party staff in Moscow. These officials have been a key element in Khrushchev's program of strengthening the party's over-all supervisory control of state activities.

The policy of encouraging greater initiative at lower levels in the administrative chain of command, which found expression in the representation of more republic and local officials on the central committee and central auditing commission elected in 1956 than was the case in 1952, has been continued in the party bodies elected at the 22nd congress.

25X1

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

SOVIET CONGRESS REVIVES CONFUSION IN COMMUNIST WORLD

The confusion and disarray in international Communist circles which followed Khrushchev's original condemnation of Stalin in 1956 have been revived as an aftermath of the Soviet 22nd party congress. Although Khrushchev's tactics at the congress were designed to reassert Soviet primacy in the Communist world, his surprise attacks on Stalin and Albania may well have increased rather than decreased Soviet problems. His apparent failure to consult or forewarn leaders of other Communist parties of his intentions has stirred resentment, in part because it caught them unprepared to deal with the strong reaction within their own parties.

European Satellites

Considerable uncertainty and a lack of uniformity have characterized the leaders of the European satellite parties as they moved to fall into line behind Khrushchev and at the same time to counter adverse reaction within their parties called up by Khrushchev's actions at the congress. Although none of these leaders appears to fear an immediate threat to the stability of his regime, there are clear indications of uneasiness and concern among all the parties, with the possible exception of Rumania.

The Bulgarian regime was the first in Eastern Europe to remove the name of Stalin from all public places and rededicate them to Lenin, but its comment on the issues involved has been restricted to relatively colorless pronouncements which do no more than pay obeisance to Premier Khrushchev's public positions. Failure of this regime to respond more forcefully may be related to factionalism in the Bulgarian leadership.

In Poland, Gomulka is evidently concerned that the delicate balance between the "revisionists" and "Stalinists" he has been able to develop and maintain within his party since 1957 now is in danger of being upset. On 4 November, just two days after his return from the Soviet party congress, Gomulka convened the Polish party central committee, apparently to establish a line which would reduce the problems which had already arisen as a result of Khrushchev's attacks. Since then, although Polish attacks on Stalinism and its fruits have been properly vitriolic, party spokesmen have been careful to emphasize that Poland had eradicated its Stalinist problem when Gomulka returned to power in October 1956 and that Warsaw's actions since that time had been certified as

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

correct in all major bloc ideological formulations.

Many Polish party members do not concede this, however. They believe that Khrushchev's renewed downgrading of Stalin formalizes what they consider to have been a "liberalization" trend in the Soviet Union since 1956. As a result, they may be emboldened to press for further political, cultural, and economic freedoms. Such a tendency is reflected in a recent article in an official central committee journal which, disputing Chou En-lai's thesis that intra-bloc differences should not be aired in public, insists that "bloc unity is not static," and adds that conflict is an inevitable rule of nature even between Communist parties. The writer, Mieczyslaw Rakowski, who is a highly regarded young Polish Communist journalist, calls in a final note for "self-determination for the parties" in relation "to specific problems," and for frank discussions in an era when the bloc is stronger than it has ever been.

Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin has had its most immediate and apparently serious effect on the East German party. Regime leaders are faced with confusion, grumbling, and even

openly expressed opposition within the party as a result of renewed attacks on Stalinism. Medium- and low-level party functionaries, already uneasy about the repressive measures they have been called upon to execute since 13 August, have been further demoralized by the increasing number of hostile questions and contrary views expressed by party members. They tend to blame their central party apparatus for this situation.

Free World Parties

Serious repercussions are also evident outside the bloc. On 5 November the official Italian Communist newspaper, L'Unita, republished large excerpts from the interview which Italian party leader Togliatti had given in 1956 concerning Khrushchev's original attacks on Stalin. The interview had been immediately and sharply criticized by Pravda at the time. Although Togliatti dutifully attacked the Albanians in his speech to the 22nd congress, he had clearly been surprised when Khrushchev opened the campaign. An Italian delegate to the congress has reported that if Togliatti had known what tack Khrushchev was to take, he would not have attended the congress, as he had not attended the November 1960 meeting of Communist leaders which discussed

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

the Sino-Soviet dispute. On the eve of the congress, Togliatti had laid a wreath on Stalin's tomb.

Two days after his return from Moscow, Togliatti republished excerpts from his 1956 interview. The excerpts include Togliatti's judgment on the "degenerate forms which Soviet bureaucracy developed under Stalin" and the need and desire for a development of "polycentrism" in the movement with the disappearance of "a single guide." These views provoked Soviet ire when they originally appeared. In speeches given at a two-day party central committee meeting and published on 12 November in L'Unita, leading Italian Communists, echoing Togliatti's statements, openly questioned Moscow's infallibility and called for autonomy for national Communist parties.

Another disaffected Communist leader is Indonesian party head Aidit, for years a firm supporter of Moscow against a faction within his own party which prefers the Chinese line. In a conversation at the Indonesian Embassy in Moscow, Aidit revealed that he was surprised and irritated by Khrushchev's approach at the congress and stated that he had taken a far more critical stand against Khrushchev during the congress than his published speech indicated. Aidit also noted that he had refused to attend the congress session which decided on the removal of Stalin's body from the Red Square mausoleum.

The Indonesian Communist party was one of the ten parties which sent messages of greetings to the Albanian party's recently concluded 20th anniversary celebration. In addition to the Indonesians, the Chinese, Vietnamese, Korean, Australian, New Zealand, Burmese,

Thai, Malayan, and Belgian parties sent greetings.

25X1

25X1

Albanian Actions

Reports from Western officials in Tirana reveal that the Albanian regime has instituted a number of emergency measures which suggest that it is apprehensive about the possibility of hostile bloc moves against the country. According to the French Embassy, restrictions on food consumption have been started, instructions have been issued for evacuation of the sick and aged to the hills, and mobilization orders have been prepared for the remainder of the population in the event of an emergency. The Soviet compound in Tirana has been surrounded by a double cordon of guards inspected regularly by the vice minister of defense, and all trees in the area have been cut down to permit better surveillance.

25X1

there was a purge of the Albanian party during mid-October and that more than 1,500 members of the party were arrested. Despite these reported developments, there is no evidence which indicates that the bloc is preparing to undertake imminent military measures against Albania.

25X1

First Secretary Hoxha is now on a tour of Albania, personally bringing to the people a continuation of the vitriolic attack he made on Khrushchev and "his revisionist group" in his 7 November anniversary celebration speech. In that speech, Hoxha countered Khrushchev's

SECRET

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

charges with charges of his own of such extreme language as to move the dispute on to a new plane. Hoxha accused Khrushchev of opportunism, revisionism, and anti-Marxism, charged him with attempting to impose his views on all Communist parties of the world, described his actions against Albania as "inhuman and monstrous," and claimed that the Albanian people and party would "live on grass" if necessary before they would recant.

Hoxha's stepped-up defiance would seem to call for a reply from the Soviet Union, and preparations may be under way for Warsaw Pact leaders to formally exclude Albania from the pact as a further move in the Soviet campaign to isolate and discredit the Hoxha regime in the Communist world. There are an increasing number of reports emanating from Warsaw that there will be a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact on or about 23 November. One of the reported rumors stipulated that first secretaries, including Khrushchev, would attend the projected meeting, and a joint condemnation of Albania is a likely result.

Chinese Response

The Chinese appear to have decided that, at least until the heat of the current Soviet-Albanian exchanges dies down a bit, their best approach is to project an impression of anxiety about the danger of these exchanges to bloc unity. They probably hope that this line will commend them to other members of the Communist world as

"conservative" and "high-minded" Marxists whose only concern is to restrain the extremists who are shattering the unity of the Socialist camp. On the other hand, since they have replaced the USSR as patrons of the Albanians, they cannot afford to appear to be disavowing Hoxha, nor do they wish to openly criticize Khrushchev and thus bring on a head-on clash with the Soviet leader.

By republishing a judicious selection of material from the Soviet and Albanian sides of the dispute, Peiping has managed to convey a clear picture of its sympathies for Hoxha and disapproval for Khrushchev while avoiding the traps on both sides. The extremism of Hoxha's response to Khrushchev, however, had made their task much more difficult. Continued indications that they consider Albania to be a member in good standing of the Sino-Soviet bloc, and reiterations that the Albanian leaders have always followed correct "Marxist-Leninist" policies, will more and more be considered by others as open defiance of the Soviet Union.

The 1 November issue of Red Flag, the leading theoretical journal of the Chinese party, still has not appeared. While the delayed issue could provide a vehicle for an official statement on the Chinese view of the current squabble, it is possible that the Chinese leaders, in view of the daily and sometimes unexpected developments within the Communist world, may prefer to withhold such a statement until the picture becomes clearer. 25X1

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

YUGOSLAVIA PRESSES FOR NEUTRALIST UNITY

Although the participants at the summit conference of non-aligned countries in Belgrade last September held sharply divergent views, Yugoslavia still considers closer co-operation among these states the principal goal of its foreign policy. In a speech on 13 November, Tito called for extending this collaboration to the economic sphere and for broadening the membership of the group. The Yugoslavs assert that a strengthened nonaligned movement is necessary to combat a campaign "from various sides" --i.e., both East and West-- against "almost all the countries which took part in the Belgrade conference."

Tito views the pressure from "reactionary circles" in the US against American aid and trade with Yugoslavia as part of this campaign, and Politika, an authoritative Belgrade daily, asserted on 2 November that Cambodian-Thai difficulties, Syria's secession from the UAR, and Ghana's problems all fell in this category. The Yugoslav leader in his 13 November speech claimed, moreover, that "closed markets" are pursuing "a discriminatory policy" against the nonaligned states.

Even though Tito considers the USSR's stepped-up de-Stalinization a "positive course," Belgrade probably is also pessimistic about any improvement in its relations with the USSR on either the state or ideological level. The Soviet 22nd party congress attacked Yugoslav policy, and on 10 November Belgrade complained bitterly that only Yugoslav correspondents

were excluded from the 7 November anniversary celebration at the Kremlin. The bloc has also failed to give substantial support to Belgrade's current propaganda and diplomatic campaign against West Germany, despite Yugoslav support of Soviet foreign policy.

The Soviets, moreover, are apparently taunting the Yugoslavs about the possible loss of US assistance; at a reception on 7 November, the Soviet assistant military attaché in Belgrade asked a Yugoslav general: "When are the Americans going to tell you that you can't have any more aid?"

Yugoslavia advocates that the nonaligned states act as a bloc in all areas of international relations. The Yugoslav press has been characterizing the recent six-nation motion in the UN for a moratorium on nuclear testing as "the resolution of nonaligned countries."

Belgrade apparently is also trying--so far without success--to foster the formation of neutralist international organizations in labor and other fields. The US Embassy in Belgrade reports that "while the Yugoslav trade unions' leaders deny any intention of encouraging formation of a neutralist trade union international, there is increasing evidence that this is actually their ultimate goal." ^{25X1}

25X1

~~SECRET~~

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****CHANGES IN PEIPING'S MILITARY CONSCRIPTION PROGRAM**

The Chinese Communists this year have altered several basic features of their military conscription program. The emphasis has been placed on urban rather than rural recruitment, and the recruitment period has been shifted from early winter to late summer and early autumn. If priority for urban recruitment is continued in succeeding years, it should provide the armed forces with personnel whose technical skills will make them more suited than peasants to handle the modern weapons and equipment which are being supplied in increasing quantities.

Peiping can be highly selective in its conscription policy because it has a manpower pool of approximately eleven million 18- and 19-year-old males from which to draw. The general criteria for selection have been political reliability, physical fitness, and literacy, but low educational levels and lack of technical skills among those selected have continued to be serious problems.

Until this year recruits were inducted in January and February, when agricultural work in the rural areas, from which the vast majority of conscripts were taken, was at a low level. After completing their tour of duty, troops have normally demobilized in February and March to permit their incorporation back into agricultural work at a propitious time. In 1960, however, this pattern was broken. The usual propaganda concerning military service was lacking, and there was no evidence that normal conscription

or demobilization was carried out. This situation prevailed until June 1961, when an intensified two-month recruitment campaign was begun.

This campaign has been concentrated in urban rather than rural areas, and an exceptionally large number of high-school students and factory workers have been conscripted. In addition, some 16- and 17-year-olds and some female students were inducted.

While the enlistment target figure (600,000-800,000) and the terms of enlistment (three years for the army, four for the air force, and five for the navy) are normal, some recruits have been told that they will be inducted into the security forces rather than the regular army. The regime may be expanding its security forces out of fear of public disturbances.

25X1

that the economy is at a low ebb and that there is much concern over food shortages for the coming winter and spring. Recently, ration cuts of up to 30 percent were imposed throughout the country.

25X1

Despite the fact that Peiping should have little difficulty in finding enthusiastic recruits--the Chinese Communists have always given the armed forces preferential treatment--there are a number of reports that students are deliberately attempting to fail their medical examinations. This could indicate symptoms of growing popular disaffection with the regime's authority.

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

The recruitment campaign has not been given widespread publicity and has not even been mentioned in the press, possibly because the regime is reluctant to inform the peasants that they are being passed over this year. Several reports indicate that some peasants have tried unsuccessfully to enlist in the army; economic conditions appear to be worse in the countryside than in the cities.

Peiping's reported explanation to the new conscripts for the switch to urban recruitment

--the regime's desire not to disturb agricultural production --is probably at least partially valid, since the keynote of all current domestic policies is "aid agriculture." By drawing the majority of its recruits from urban elements, conscription this year will involve minimal disruption of the intensified agricultural effort. In addition, many factory workers have little to do, because the slowdown in industrial production has left many factories standing idle.

25X1

FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND

The constitutional crisis in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is likely to deepen before the end of this month as a result of a renewed campaign by secession-minded Africans in Nyasaland. Agitation for Nyasaland's withdrawal from the Federation is likely to stimulate similar pressure in Northern Rhodesia, where Britain is moving cautiously toward a constitutional settlement with little hope of fully satisfying either whites or Africans. In Southern Rhodesia, an African drift toward intransigence is likely to be met by increased determination on the part of the white-controlled government to maintain control of the security situation while simultaneously removing many social and economic

irritants. In these complex circumstances, survival of the Federation, even in a truncated form, is doubtful.

Nyasaland politics are dominated by Hastings Banda's Malawi Congress party. Banda and his followers have entered the government--Banda is minister of natural resources--and have ordered the party rank and file to refrain from actively expressing their opposition to Nyasaland's continued membership in the "stupid Federation." There is no indication, however, that the Malawi stand has changed; the Malawi-controlled legislature will probably pass a strongly anti-Federation resolution when it convenes late this month. Should the response to this action

SECRET


SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

in London or Salisbury not be to his liking, Banda might withdraw from the government and go into opposition--a move which the British believe "would inevitably lead to violence."

25X1

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

In Northern Rhodesia, the governor announced recently that the violence which has been plaguing parts of the protectorate has ended. Britain is now attempting to revise the constitutional proposals which it made last summer and which were rejected by Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence party (UNIP). The British believe that the violence demonstrated both Kaunda's indecisiveness and the weakness of his control over local UNIP branches; moreover, the African outbreaks hardened right-wing European sentiment. Britain will probably have to impose a settlement which will be only an interim answer to African demands but nevertheless will be rejected by much of the white community.



African nationalists in Southern Rhodesia have decided to boycott the first elections to be held under the colony's new constitution, which the largely white electorate approved in a referendum last June. The Africans apparently feel that "action" is the only means by which African government can be achieved, and they are likely to come into increasing conflict with Prime Minister Whitehead's government. Although the government is encouraging the rapid removal of many social and economic irritants, it has repeatedly stated its determination to resist African political pressure.

Britain has hoped to preserve the Federation in some form in order to retain the economic advantages of the association. However, the British governor of Northern Rhodesia recently stated that he believed Nyasaland could not be kept in the Federation, and that if Nyasaland left, Northern Rhodesia would probably follow. A breakup would be followed by economic deterioration and probably by violence in both Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****TURKEY**

25X1

Turkey's parties, a month after the elections, are still unable to agree on a coalition government. The military junta continues to hope that the politicians will break the present impasse and form a coalition which will govern constitutionally, respect the position of the military, and uphold the reform measures taken by the military after overthrowing the Menderes regime in May 1960. However, as civilian extremists opposed to the military continue to make clear their intention to undo these measures, sentiment in the armed forces for direct military rule can be expected to increase.

The Committee of National Union (CNU), which for 17 months was the front for a junta of key military commanders, has dissolved itself, and the junta is acting through the newly elected President, former CNU head Cemal Gursel. Other groups of officers, including some in the war college in Istanbul, appear to be plotting to take control if it appears likely that the pro-Menderes elements may gain control of the government. Col. Alparslan Turkes and several of the 14 former CNU members who were exiled in November 1960 because of their open advocacy of military rule may return to Turkey and add to the pressure for continued military control.

On 24 October the junta laid down the conditions under which it would yield to a civilian government. It then stepped back in the hope that the civilians could reach a solution. The leaders of the pro-Menderes Justice and New Turkey parties seem to realize the need of being cooperative, in view of the temper of the military. However, they fear that if they agreed to a coalition led by the pro-military Republican People's party (RPP), their more militant members might block this or even seize control of the parties from the moderates. Osman Bolukbasi--leader of the other pro-Menderes party, the small, religiously conservative Republican Nation Peasant party--has refused to participate in any coalition. No single party has a majority in parliament, although the pro-Menderes parties as a bloc would have more than half the vote.

In a belated effort to end the impasse, Gursel designated 78-year-old RPP leader Ismet Inonu to form a cabinet, but it appears unlikely that the former President will succeed.

25X1

25X1

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****PORTUGAL**

25X1

25X1

Opponents of Premier Salazar expect extensive repressive measures in the wake of the 12 November election. All opposition candidates withdrew when President Thomaz refused their petition for "free and clean" elections. As a result, the National Assembly for another four years will be made up entirely of Salazar's National Union party.

The opposition expects key members of its district electoral commissions to be arrested in a move to block even this extremely limited opportunity to develop a "grass roots" political organization. If the students who demonstrated for the opposition during the electoral campaign attempt any organized protests, they will probably be rapidly cowed by security police units. Continued plotting by exiled oppositionists can be expected, but the recent complete split between General Humberto Delgado and Henrique Galvao further hampers effective exile action.

The military remains the only force capable of effecting a change in the political structure. Most of the military probably remains completely loyal, but many junior officers, although chiefly concerned about pay and promotion prospects, are nevertheless also dissatisfied with the government's political and economic

policies.

Meanwhile, Portugal is under increasingly severe attack in the UN General Assembly for its policies toward its overseas territories. The assembly's Trusteeship Committee voted overwhelmingly on 13 November to condemn Portugal for its refusal to report on conditions in its territories, as it was ordered to do by last year's assembly. Only Spain and South Africa supported Portugal, while France and Bolivia abstained.

The large vote in favor of condemnation presages a serious Afro-Asian attempt to get UN political and economic sanctions approved when the assembly debates the question of human rights in Angola in late November. The African states have already served notice that they will focus on Lisbon's alleged use of NATO arms in putting down native uprisings. The assembly's action is likely to rally strong domestic support for Salazar.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

ECUADOR

Former Vice President Arosemena, who succeeded to the Ecuadorean presidency on 8 November, has inherited pressing economic problems and faces difficult political choices. His cabinet appointments and most of his initial policy pronouncements indicate a broad rapprochement with rightist groups, which originally distrusted his close ties with the left. However, he is also deeply obligated to Communist and leftist forces for the mass support they provided in his contest with ousted President Velasco.

Arosemena may face rightist plotting if he moves too far to the left, or violent opposition by leftist groups if he fails to include them in his administration and satisfy their demands for rapid socioeconomic reforms--demands which are beyond the limited financial resources of the government.

Arosemena's accession, which followed several days of violence, came about through extensive leftist-organized demonstrations, unanimous congressional approval, and ultimate acceptance by the armed forces to avoid the danger of civil war. Moderate-rightist groups apparently had reached agreement with him prior to Velasco's ouster in the belief that they could exert a substantial or controlling influence over his administration.

Arosemena's first cabinet includes two moderate Socialists, three Liberals, two Social Christians, one Conservative, and one independent rightist, but no extreme leftists or Communists. The new minister of foreign affairs and the new minister of government and police are both anti-Communist and friendly to the US, and both have indicated to US Ambassador Bernbaum their dislike of the Castro regime. Strong anti-Communists have been named to the top military command. Arosemena also encouraged congress to elect to the vice presidency Reinaldo Varea, former profes-

sional military man, in spite of leftist preferences for another candidate.

Arosemena's first policy pronouncements were relatively moderate but slanted to mollify leftist-Communist supporters passed over in the selection of the cabinet. He declared that he was willing to establish relations with any country, would trade with all nations, and would continue relations with the Castro regime.

25X1

25X1

There is already evidence of leftist resentment, particularly among Communist party leaders and within Ecuador's principal labor organization, which they dominate. This organization launched the general strike of 4 October, which failed to gain its immediate objectives but touched off widespread public violence contributing to Velasco's eventual downfall. The strikers had protested the rapidly rising cost of living and the new taxes which the government had enacted to meet its heavy budget deficit--its major immediate economic problem.

Ecuador's deteriorating economic situation, which springs partly from declining prices for its main exports, includes a sharp reduction in foreign exchange reserves since September 1960, compounded by a flight of capital. The new government also inherits the popular resentment of Velasco's failure to initiate promised economic development projects.

Arosemena probably will continue to cultivate both left and right, at least until he has consolidated his position.

25X6

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****BRAZIL**

The declining public confidence in Brazil's new government--reflected in a deteriorating financial situation--stems largely from the absence of a clearly established chief of government. While President Goulart has thus far generally dominated Prime Minister Neves, the constitutional amendment of 2 September, which set up a parliamentary form of government, gives primacy to Neves, and conservative congressional leaders are unwilling to accept the fact of Goulart's continuing power.

Leaders of Brazil's two principal conservative parties have repeatedly criticized Neves for cooperating with Goulart and have threatened to bring about the prime minister's ouster. Goulart has apparently countered these threats thus far by reminding political leaders that he has the power to nominate the new prime minister and that they cannot expect him to nominate a political enemy.

A critical financial situation is reflected in a deterioration of the exchange rate for Brazil's cruzeiro from 270 to the dollar last August to 330 in mid-November. Food prices in the city of Rio de Janeiro rose 6 percent in September, bringing the increase for the first nine months of 1961 to 26 percent. The American Embassy reports an increasing flight of capital and a sharp drop in foreign private investment.

Congressional action on the government's program to reform the tax structure and combat inflation, presented to Congress by Neves on 14 November, will indicate the chances for effective leadership under the Goulart-Neves government. Even if conservative leaders find the program acceptable, they may hesitate to ratify it unless by doing so they can strengthen Neves at Goulart's expense.

Conservative concern over leftist strength in Brazil has been heightened by the formation in late October of the National Liberation Front. This group, which hopes to take over control of Congress from the conservatives in next October's elections, is headed by two governors who supported Goulart's accession to the presidency, but it also includes advocates of Janio Quadros' return to power. Although the front is not accepting the participation of avowed Communists, its program is close to the Communist line, and the Brazilian Communist party publicly announced its support on 1 November, simultaneously denouncing the present government for continuing the "mistakes" of Quadros in "submitting to International Monetary Fund control," in not expropriating foreign capital, and in limiting agrarian reform. Further attacks will probably be provoked by the announcement in Brasilia on 14 November that Goulart will soon visit the United States.

A struggle between conservatives and leftists for influence over President Goulart apparently is now concerned with the question of resuming diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. After a conversation with an influential conservative leader, Goulart announced on 31 October that the restoration of relations would be delayed. Foreign Minister Dantas--a key ideological leader of the left--has now, in an evident effort to maintain public expectation of an early renewal of relations, released information to the press that all preparations for renewing relations are complete and only the Brazilian Government's decision is needed. On the Cuban question, however, conservative forces have thus far exerted less influence, and Brazil appears to be maintaining strong opposition to inter-American action on the issue.

SECRET

25X1

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****SPACE PROGRAMS IN WESTERN EUROPE**

Efforts begun in the past year to organize a European cooperative program for the exploration of outer space appear to have made some headway in recent weeks. At a meeting in Munich on 24 and 25 October, delegates from 12 West European countries* "virtually completed" a draft treaty to establish the European Space Research Organization (ESRO). Most of these countries** were also represented at a subsequent meeting in London at which the delegates agreed to refer to their governments a revised convention for the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO). While several of ELDO's potential participants have little enthusiasm for the project, its co-sponsors--Britain and France--now have West Germany's support, and these key powers, at least, seem ready to go ahead.

The more favorable outlook for ESRO, which is expected to begin operations next year, is due in considerable part to the support it has always enjoyed among leading European scientists. In consequence, technical planning has kept pace with the drafting of the necessary treaty, and once this is ratified, the ambitious program can get under way. In addition to a complex of tracking stations, ESRO would construct a center for the gathering and processing of space data, and a technical-scientific institute for space research employing some 800 persons. The proposed schedule calls for initial concentration on the launching of small sounding rockets, but earth satellites would be attempted in the fourth

*The UK, France, West Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Ireland, and Austria.

**UK, France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Spain, and Australia. Observers from Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland were admitted.

year of ESRO's operation. Lunar satellites would follow in the eighth year.

While ESRO's planners are keeping open the possibility of using launching equipment of both European and American origin, ELDO's sponsors expect to supply the vehicle required for the latter phases of ESRO's initial program. As originally proposed by London, the first stage would be Britain's Blue Streak missile--reportedly developed at a cost of \$280,-000,000 but abandoned as a military project in April 1960. The second stage would be the French Veronique. The source of the third stage is ostensibly undecided, but it is generally understood that West Germany has been given primary responsibility for its development.

British Minister of Aviation Thorneycroft announced on 3 November following the London meeting that the first operational test of the complete "European" launcher is contemplated for mid-1965 from the Woomera range in Australia. London has already requested authorization to release to other European governments information it acquired from American contractors in the development of the Blue Streak.

It is uncertain how many countries beyond the key participants will sign the ELDO convention by 27 November, the target date. Some European scientists remain critical of the prospective dispersion of Western talent in further development of an obsolescent rocket, and some of the smaller countries suspect that the opportunities for participating in subcontracting will be limited. The European neutrals may also be wary of participating in work with obvious military implications, although--largely because of US influence--the ELDO convention has been modified to specify its "peaceful" objectives and to curb the release of technical information to nonmembers.

(Concurred in by OSI)

SECRET

25X1

25X1

~~SECRET~~

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

SPECIAL ARTICLES

NEWCOMERS IN THE TOP SOVIET LEADERSHIP

The men newly elected to the Soviet party's presidium and secretariat at the recently concluded 22nd congress are, for the most part, representatives of the younger generation of party professionals who have been brought into leading positions during Khrushchev's administration.

The Presidium

In the presidium, which is charged with the over-all formulation of Soviet policy, one candidate member was elevated to full membership, and two new candidate members were added.

Gennady Ivanovich Voronov, a fast-rising party careerist with considerable experience in agricultural work, is the only new face among the 11 full members of the presidium. At the congress, he was also chosen as Khrushchev's first deputy on the bureau which administers party affairs in the Russian Republic (RSFSR).

Voronov, 51 years old, has been a party member since 1931



VORONOV

and a member of the central committee since the 19th congress in 1952. From 1947 until 1955 he served as second, then first secretary of the party organization in Chita Oblast, in the RSFSR. He was then named deputy minister of agriculture, shortly after Khrushchev initiated the grandiose campaign to farm the "virgin lands" of Russia and the central Asian republics. Voronov held this post for two years, and in 1957 was named party chief in Orenburg Oblast in the New Lands area of the RSFSR.

It now seems clear that Voronov was brought into the top leadership to replace Avery Aristov. Voronov left Orenburg last January to become a candidate member of the presidium and a deputy chairman of the Bureau for the RSFSR. Less than a week later Aristov--who had until then been Khrushchev's principal deputy and agriculture specialist on the bureau--was sent as ambassador to Warsaw. The replacement process was completed at the 22nd congress when Aristov was dropped from full membership on the presidium.

Vladimir Vasilyevich Shcherbitsky, now chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, is one of two new candidate members of the party presidium. He rose to prominence in the party organization of the Ukraine. He appears to be an expert in the field of heavy industry--particularly the chemical industry.

Other than the fact that he entered the party in 1941, nothing is recorded about Shcherbitsky's career prior to 1952, when he became a member of the auditing commission of

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



SHCHERBITSKY

the Ukrainian party. Subsequently he spent several years in the Dnepropetrovsk area, first as secretary of the city party committee during 1953-54, then as secretary of Dnepropetrovsk Oblast committee. He was first secretary in the oblast from 1955 to 1957.

Elected to the Ukrainian central committee as a candidate member in 1954, Shcherbitsky was made a full member in 1956. Immediately thereafter, he served as a delegate to the 20th party congress, where he was made a member of the central auditing commission in Moscow. In 1957 he became secretary of the Ukrainian central committee and a member of the republic party presidium. In February 1961 he was released from his duties as party secretary and was appointed republic premier, replacing Nikifor Kalchenko, who was removed in the wake of Khrushchev's attack on Ukrainian agriculture at the January plenum of the central committee.

In addition to his long service in the heavily industrialized Dnepropetrovsk area, Shcherbitsky since 1959 has been chairman of the Ukrainian commission for the development

of the chemical industry. His speeches, moreover, have dealt predominantly with problems in the various branches of heavy industry.

Sharif Rashidovich Rashidov, an Uzbek and a well-known writer, has been party chief in Soviet Uzbekistan since 1959. He was elected a presidium candidate, probably to replace his fellow Uzbek, Mukhitdinov, and to continue Central Asian representation in the top party leadership. As a member of the presidium of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity With Asian and African Countries, Rashidov has been extremely active in relations with Afro-Asian countries and has traveled extensively in them. He continues to write; his novel Stronger Than a Storm was nominated for a Lenin Prize in 1960 and 1961.

Rashidov was born in 1917 in what is now Samarkand Oblast. After graduating from the philosophy faculty of the Uzbek State University in 1941, he served with the Red Army but was demobilized in 1942 after being severely wounded. During the next several years he served as a local party secretary in various oblasts and as chief editor of two newspapers in Uzbekistan. In 1949



RASHIDOV

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

USSR: EVOLUTION OF THE PARTY PRESIDUM 1952-61						25X1
Full Member, Presidium, Soviet Communist Party Candidate Member, Presidium, Soviet Communist Party						Full-time Party Functionaries Full-time Government Functionaries
OCTOBER 1952	MARCH 1953	FEBRUARY 1956	JUNE 1957	JANUARY 1961	OCTOBER 1961	
Stalin Aristov Khrushchev Malenkov Mikheylov Ponomarev Suslov Brezhnev Ignatov Pegov Shkiriyatov Andrianov Melnikov Patalichev Puzanov	Khrushchev Ignatov Shatalin Suslov Melnikov Bagirov	Khrushchev Suslov Brezhnev Furtseva Shepilov Belyayev Aristov Pospelov Shvernik Kirichenko Kozlov Kolbin Kuznetsov Mazurov Mukhlidinov	Khrushchev Suslov Belyayev Aristov Brezhnev Furtseva Kuusinen Pospelov Shvernik Ignatov Kirichenko Kozlov Kolbin Kuznetsov Mazurov Mukhlidinov	Khrushchev Kozlov Kuusinen Mukhlidinov Suslov Shvernik Voronov Pospelov Podgorny Kirilenko Mazurov Mahavandze	Khrushchev Kozlov Kuusinen Suslov Demichev Ilichev Ponomarev Shelepin Spiridonov Shvernik Voronov Podgorny Mazurov Mahavandze Rashidov	
SECRETARIAT	SECRETARIAT	SECRETARIAT	SECRETARIAT	SECRETARIAT	SECRETARIAT	
PARTY CONTROL COMMISSION		PARTY CONTROL COMMISSION	PARTY CONTROL COMMISSION			
PROVINCIAL PARTY SECRETARIES	PROVINCIAL PARTY SECRETARIES	PROVINCIAL PARTY SECRETARIES	PROVINCIAL PARTY SECRETARIES	PROVINCIAL PARTY SECRETARIES	PROVINCIAL PARTY SECRETARIES	
Stalin Shvernik Beriya Bulganin Ignatov Kaganovich Malenkov Molotov Pervukhin Ponomarev Saburov Voroshilov Kabanov Kosygin Telesyan Vydrinskiy Zverev Karotchenko Kuusinen	Beriya Bulganin Kaganovich Mikoyan Molotov Pervukhin Saburov Voroshilov Ponomarev	Bulganin Voroshilov Kaganovich Mikoyan Molotov Pervukhin Saburov Malenkov Zhukov	Bulganin Voroshilov Mikoyan Zhukov Kosygin Pervukhin Karotchenko	Khrushchev Brezhnev Kosygin Mikoyan Ignatov Furtseva Aristov Pervukhin Polyansky Kolbin Karotchenko	Khrushchev Kozlov Kuusinen Suslov Demichev Ilichev Ponomarev Shelepin Spiridonov Shvernik Voronov Podgorny Mazurov Mahavandze Rashidov	
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS			PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	
MISCELLANEOUS	Shvernik — TRADE UNION HEAD			Grishin — TRADE UNION HEAD	Grishin — TRADE UNION HEAD	

he was elected chairman of the Board of the Uzbek Union of Writers.

During a general personnel shake-up in the republic in 1950, Rashidov was appointed chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and, as such, titular chief of the Uzbek "state." He remained in this post until March 1959 when he was elected party first secretary to replace S. Kamalov, who was ousted for "serious mistakes and shortcomings."

The Secretariat

Five newcomers--Demichev, Ilichev, Ponomarev, Shelepin, and Spiridonov--were elected to the central committee secretariat, the party's powerful administrative arm headed by Khrushchev. With the retention of Kozlov, Suslov, and Kuusinen,

membership on this body now stands at nine.

Petr Nilych Demichev is a product of the Moscow party organization, where he has served continuously since 1948. Primarily noted for his work as a propagandist and agitator,



DEMICHEV

SECRET

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

he has given considerable attention to problems of ideological work and party education as well.

Born in 1912, Demichev joined the party in 1939 and acquired his first experience in party work as a political officer in the army during World War II. In 1948 he became third secretary of a rayon party committee in Moscow. In late 1950 or early 1951, he was promoted to deputy chief of a department of the Moscow City committee. During this period, Khrushchev was Moscow Oblast party boss. In June 1956, Demichev was made a secretary of the Moscow Oblast committee, and kept this assignment until July 1958.

After a brief period in an unspecified job in the USSR Council of Ministers, Demichev became first secretary of the Moscow Oblast committee in March 1959, and appears to have concentrated on agricultural problems. In that same year, he was elected a delegate to the 21st party congress. In July 1960, he returned to the city party organization as first secretary. He has not previously been a member of the all-union central committee.

Leonid Fedorovich Ilichev, a veteran journalist, is one of the Soviet Union's top propagandists and has compiled an impressive record of experience in ideological and mass political indoctrination. As head of the central committee's propaganda and agitation department (agitprop) since 1958, he has directly supervised the party's propaganda machine and has spearheaded the Khrushchev-inspired drive to inject freshness and vigor into traditionally dull party propaganda.



ILICHEV

Ilichev has apparently profited from the patronage both of Khrushchev and of party secretary Mikhail Suslov. There is some evidence that he may have fallen victim to political maneuvering by Stalin's immediate subalterns during the postwar period.

Ilichev, now in his mid-50s, has been a party member since 1923. He studied at the Institute of Red Professorship in Moscow and, by his own account, once taught philosophy. In 1939 he was appointed to the editorial board of the party theoretical journal Bolshevik (now Kommunist). After working on the staff of Pravda during the early years of World War II, he was named chief editor of Izvestia in 1944.

Ilichev was named a deputy chief of the propaganda and agitation directorate in early 1948; this appointment took place a few months after Suslov's election in 1947 to the central party secretariat and appointment as agitprop chief. Ilichev remained in this post after July 1948, when agitprop was downgraded from directorate to department and turned over to Malenkov's protégé Dmitry Shepilov. Shepilov in 1957

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

was denounced, along with his mentor, as a member of the anti-party group.

Ilichev left agitprop in late 1949 to become deputy chief of Pravda when Suslov became chief editor. Ilichev was promoted to the chief editorship in 1951, and at the 19th party congress (October 1952) was elected a candidate member of the central committee. The following month, however, he was replaced as Pravda chief by Shepilov and was also dropped from the editorial board of Bolshevik.

Ilichev was not again identified until the summer of 1953, when he was named head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's press division to succeed a long-time associate of secret police chief Lavrenty Beria. Since 1954 he has accompanied Khrushchev on all his major trips abroad, and was a delegate to the United Nations from 1954 to 1956. At the 20th party congress, he was elected only to the central auditing commission, probably because his position as press chief for the Foreign Ministry did not warrant re-election as a central committee candidate. Ilichev remained with the Foreign Ministry until 1958, when he was appointed chief of agitprop.

Boris N. Ponomarev has been head of the international department of the central committee, which deals with Communist parties outside the bloc, since shortly after the 20th congress in 1956. Since then, he has emerged as one of the chief ideological spokesmen for Soviet foreign policy. Earlier rumors that he was slated to replace Pospelov as Khrushchev's principal adviser in this area seem to have been borne out,



PONOMAREV

and he now appears to have taken the place on the secretariat which Pospelov vacated in May 1960. Ponomarev is reported to have played an important role in Khrushchev's polemics with the Chinese Communists.

Ponomarev's election to candidate membership in the central committee at the 19th party congress in 1952 marked the beginning of his rise into the top party hierarchy. Previously, he had served as assistant director of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute and had made a name for himself as the author of numerous publications on the history of the party. In 1955 he accompanied Khrushchev and Bulganin to Yugoslavia as an adviser; at the 20th party congress he was promoted to full membership on the central committee. In March 1956, he additionally became a member of the editorial board of the party theoretical journal, Kommunist.

As head of the central committee's international department, Ponomarev gained wide experience in dealing with foreign Communist parties. He had maintained extensive contacts with nonbloc Communist leaders and has frequently

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

visited them abroad. In 1958 he reportedly headed an international commission on revisionism, which also had the task of coordinating the activities of the various Communist parties.

Ponomarev has frequently been called on to provide ideological ammunition for Soviet foreign policy, and after the 20th congress he wrote a number of articles supporting the new "popular front" line, urging cooperation between Communists and socialists in areas where they had common interests. When Moscow abandoned this line, Ponomarev provided the ideological justification in an important article in *Kommunist*. His recent articles have dealt not only with the world Communist movement, but increasingly with some of the broader themes of Khrushchev's foreign policy, including peaceful coexistence and the noninevitability of war.

Apart from the fact that he is "grim and tight-lipped," little is known about Ponomarev or his personal life. Even his age can only be estimated roughly: he would appear to be in his early sixties, since he joined the party in 1919 and fought in the civil war.

Aleksandr Nikolayevich Shelepin's election as a central committee secretary followed three years of service as head of the Soviet secret police (KGB). He has been a full member of the party central committee since 1952.

Shelepin was born in Voronezh in 1918. During 1936-39 he studied history at the Moscow Institute of History, Philosophy, and Liter-

ature. He served in the Red Army during the Russo-Finnish War of 1939-40. He became a member of the Communist party in the latter year. He also began his career in the Soviet Youth Organization (Komsomol) in 1940 and was assigned to the Moscow city organization, where he worked until 1943.

Shelepin was named secretary for cadres of the All-Union Komsomol in 1943, and was raised to the second secretaryship in 1949. In the immediate postwar period he often represented the Komsomol abroad at meetings of the International Union of Students and the World Federation of Democratic Youth. He became first secretary of the All-Union Komsomol in November 1952. Under his direction, the youth organization played a major role in sending young people out to work in the New Lands and in building up Siberia.

In April 1958, Shelepin became head of the central committee's party organs department, which is chiefly responsible for personnel procurement and for checking the work of Soviet party, trade union, and Komsomol

**SHELEPIN****SECRET**

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

25X1

INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATE-USSR PARTY AND GOVERNMENT


31 OCTOBER 1961

Full Member, Presidium, Soviet Communist Party

Candidate Members, Presidium, Soviet Communist Party

PARTY

GOVERNMENT



611102 2A

25X1

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

organizations. In December he left this post to replace career policeman Ivan Serov as head of the KGB. Some reports have suggested that Serov had in some way incurred Khrushchev's ill will--perhaps by failing to tip the Kremlin off concerning conditions in Hungary prior to the 1956 revolt. Whatever the cause, suggestions that Serov did suffer a fall from grace appear borne out by the fact that he now has been dropped from the central committee.

Despite his lack of intelligence experience, Shelepin evidently revamped the KGB into a first-rate foreign and counterintelligence organization of the kind Khrushchev apparently desired. He seems to have succeeded in overcoming the prolonged siege of poor morale in the KGB following the purge of Beria and subsequent revelations of secret police excesses. In his public speeches, Shelepin constantly reiterated that police terror could never recur, and that the KGB's primary concern is eliminating the threat to Soviet security posed by hostile intelligence services.

Ivan Vasilyevich Spiridonov rose to prominence in the Leningrad area during the years when Frol Kozlov was head of the party organization there. In December 1957 he replaced Kozlov as first secretary of the Leningrad Oblast party committee. Spiridonov, like Demichev, has not previously been a member of the party central committee. Since 1959, however, he has been a member of the central committee's Bureau for the RSFSR, which,

**SPIRIDONOV**

under Khrushchev's chairmanship, administers party affairs in the Russian Federation.

Spiridonov was born in 1905 and joined the Communist party in 1928. He is apparently a mechanical engineer by training. During World War II and until 1950 he was a factory director in Leningrad, and then transferred to party work as secretary of the party committee in one of the city's rayons. He served from 1952 to 1954 as deputy chairman of the Leningrad Oblast executive committee, and then returned to party work as an oblast party secretary under Kozlov, whom he replaced when Kozlov was transferred to Moscow and to full presidium membership following the defeat of the anti-party group in 1957.

At the 21st party congress in February 1959, Spiridonov--possibly at the behest of Khrushchev--bitterly attacked the anti-party group. He repeated this performance at the 22nd party congress and, along with Demichev, also told the congress that the "workers of Leningrad and Moscow" had demanded the removal of Stalin's body from the Lenin-Stalin Mausoleum in Red Square.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

DE GAULLE, EUROPE, AND BERLIN

De Gaulle views Soviet efforts to alter the status of West Berlin and legalize the division of Germany as having the ultimate aim of separating West Germany from its allies. He is opposed to East-West negotiations which might lead to an agreement on a Central European "security zone," because his hope of making France's influence felt in world affairs is dependent on his plans for a Western European grouping responsive to his leadership. Nevertheless, if high-level East-West discussions are held, De Gaulle will probably participate but insist on broadening the agenda to play down the Berlin issue, on which he feels the West has little to win and much to lose.

De Gaulle's Interest in Europe

The rapid loss of France's overseas holdings under the Fifth Republic forced De Gaulle to give up his dream of a French-led Eurafrikan power complex, and he has since been turning more directly to Europe itself for the support he seeks to make French influence felt in international politics. In a major speech in May 1960, he said: "To contribute to building Western Europe into a political, economic, cultural, and human group, organized for action, progress, and defense--that is what France wants to work toward. . . . France has recognized the necessity of this Western Europe, which in former times was the dream of the wise and the ambition of the powerful and which appears today as the indispensable condition of the equilibrium of the world."

The keystone of the Western European structure De Gaulle wants to build is a close relationship between France and West Germany. He had long disparaged the European integration

efforts launched in the 1950s, but when he came to power in 1958, "Europeans" were pleasantly surprised to find that his government was moving quickly to put into effect measures establishing the Common Market.

This was at first attributed to De Gaulle's personal lack of interest in economic affairs as much as to his desire for a French-German rapprochement. The basic reason for his acceptance of further integration then, however, was his conviction that a close personal relationship with Chancellor Adenauer would permit development of a loose Continental association in which France would attain a pre-eminent position. Since then he has moved toward an organization of national states which would surrender full sovereignty only at some distant date when the development of a "European" patriotism would give substance to a European political entity.

A number of events seem to have led to an acceleration of the timetable he envisaged and may be forcing a reassessment of his original desires. British interest in the Common Market has obliged De Gaulle to reconsider his views that a US-British bloc was a natural association which would leave France free to play a leading role in Europe in a period when emerging Chinese power would increasingly weaken Russian influence in the West. The departure of Adenauer from political control in Bonn sometime before 1965 is also a factor, but most pressing of all is probably the threat of a Soviet move to block the rapprochement of France and West Germany. These help explain the sense of urgency evident in the current French drive for a formal political organization to coordinate the foreign and defense policies of the Common Market countries.

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****Opposition to Negotiation**

De Gaulle's major apprehension is that Bonn will be drawn away from the Western European structure. In French thinking, the most direct threat to the Western European alliance would come through an East-West agreement establishing a neutral zone in Central Europe, and Paris is quick to object to any hint of this concept. France has opposed the establishment of limited arms-inspection zones, and, more recently, French officials who praised the general tenor of President Kennedy's references to Germany in his September UN speech were concerned over his statement on European security.



French officials feel that Khrushchev's decision to relax his year-end deadline for an East German peace treaty may have been aimed at easing tension in order to draw the West into wide-ranging negotiations.

French fears are probably not entirely allayed by public and private assurances that Washington would not accept a broad Berlin settlement contingent on detaching West Germany from its present alliances. A British Foreign Office representative reportedly brought up the question of European security in Paris in mid-October, and De Gaulle is likely to stress during his talks with Macmillan from 24 to 26 November the link between the UK's desire to join the European Economic Community and the necessity for continued unrestricted West German membership if the European grouping is to survive.

Many top officials in Paris are also convinced that even if an East-West agreement were limited to the narrower issue of defining a new status for Berlin, the West would be tempted to make concessions which would demoralize the West German population. The increased movement of West Berliners to West Germany and other signs of declining public morale since the construction of the Berlin wall probably reinforce De Gaulle's feeling that if the arbitrary division of Berlin were ratified by a formal East-West agreement, the effect in West Germany could be disastrous.

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, resorting to hyperbole, told Senator Humphrey on 11 October that the Germans were in "complete disarray" and had been greatly shaken by the misleading press statements following the Rusk-Gromyko talks. De Gaulle complained to Ambassador Gavin on 23 October that US acceptance of negotiations with the Soviet Union had cost Adenauer votes in the September elections.

De Gaulle's View of the Soviets

De Gaulle's desire to preserve the status quo in Central Europe stems from the importance he attributes to West German ties with France and to the threat to them implicit in either East-West negotiations on "European security arrangements" or a legal recognition of the division of Germany. As he analyzed the situation for Ambassador Gavin, "Either the Soviets do not want a general war, in which case there is no reason to hurry into negotiations, or they do want a war, in which case we would be negotiating under threat and they would eventually wage the war anyway."

De Gaulle seems convinced that the Soviet Union does not wish to risk a general war, and he has said publicly that if the

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

West stands firm, internal difficulties within the Soviet Union and the bloc will work over the years to lessen the threat. He probably sees confirmation of these views in the recent Soviet party congress.

President De Gaulle has refused to be budged from a firm stand against negotiations, despite public disclosure of Western differences and more flexible views prevalent among the French public and ranking officials of the Foreign Ministry. He apparently was personally responsible for the decision not to send a French representative to the meeting which senior Western foreign affairs officials were scheduled to attend in London on 19 October. This "splendid isolation" has resulted in considerable criticism of the President in France, even in the conservative press.

France has also sought to maintain the status quo by seeking to avoid incidents which might themselves increase tensions in Berlin and renew the international clamor for East-West negotiations. The West German F-84 pilots who strayed into East Germany and then landed at Tegel airport in the French sector of West Berlin were quietly repatriated.

While standing firmly on its right as one of the four occupying powers to have its officials circulate in East Berlin without interference by East German guards, France has not been energetic in its probes of the sector border and is apparently agreeable to

a self-imposed ban on civilian movement into East Berlin rather than back such moves with military force. Paris has carefully limited the authority of its representatives in Berlin in order to retain full control of the situation and assure that all policy decisions are made at the highest level.

For the Future

In view of President De Gaulle's conviction that his long-range objectives are so intimately dependent on the outcome of East-West discussion of Berlin and Germany, he is not likely to shift his present course.

Nevertheless, in the final analysis it hardly seems likely that De Gaulle would hold France aloof from a heads-of-state meeting. It is doubtful that he views the present Berlin crisis as significantly different from that which preceded the 1959 meeting of foreign ministers or the abortive 1960 summit meeting. In both of those cases, De Gaulle, after considerable reluctance, dropped his charge of "insufficient preparation" and participated. He is likely, however, to demand that the agenda be broadened to include such favorite topics as disarmament and joint East-West aid to underdeveloped countries, and to insist that the Allies state unequivocally Western opposition to formalizing in an East-West agreement a status for West Germany different from that of the rest of Western Europe.

25X1

25X1

~~SECRET~~

25X1

Page Denied

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

Page Denied

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied